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Corporate-Owned Life Insurance: Another
Financial Scheme That Takes Advantage
of Employees and Shareholders
SUSAN LORDE MARTIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
For many years, corporations have been insuring the lives of their
key employees to protect the corporations from economic losses in the
event of the employees' deaths.' Insurance companies encouraged the
corporate-owned life insurance (COLI) programs by emphasizing their
tax advantages.2 Corporations began to maximize the tax benefits by
taking large loans to pay for policy premiums and then obtaining large
income tax deductions for the interest payments.3 When the Tax
Reform Act of 19864 curtailed these unintended tax benefits by impos-
ing a $50,000 per-insured-employee limit on the amount of indebtedness
for which interest was deductible, insurance companies created new
kinds of COLI policies. 5 One kind has been called "dead peasant poli-
cies ' '6 or "janitors' insurance. '  These are life insurance policies that
corporations purchase for rank-and-file employees, naming the corpora-
tion as the beneficiary when the employee dies.8
There is widespread use of janitors' insurance by corporations and
by banks (BOLI)9 because it boosts their bottom lines. 10 However, the
current arrangement takes advantage of uninformed employees and mis-
* Professor of Legal Studies in Business, Zarb School of Business, Hofstra University.
1. Am. Elec. Power, Inc. v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 2d 762, 768 (S.D. Ohio 2001), afl'd,
326 F.3d 737 (2003).
2. Id.; see also infra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
3. Am. Elec. Power, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 768.
4. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1003, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
26 U.S.C.).
5. H. REP. No. 102-432, at 61 (1992).
6. 149 CONG. REc. E76-02 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2003) (statement of Rep. Green).
7. Ellen E. Schultz & Theo Francis, The Economy: Senator to Target Tax Boon to Firms
Insuring Workers, WALL ST. J., May 3, 2002, at A2.
8. 149 CONG. Rac. E76-02, supra note 4.
9. See, e.g., Ellen E. Schultz & Theo Francis, Many Banks Boost Earnings with 'Janitors'
Life Insurance, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2002, at Al (noting that many banks in the United States
buy life insurance policies on the lives of their rank-and-file employees); Ellen E. Schultz & Theo
Francis, Valued Employees. Worker Dies, Firm Profits, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2002, at AI (noting
that millions of current and former employees at hundreds of large companies are covered by
COLI).
10. See infra notes 134 & 139 and accompanying text.
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leads shareholders. Shareholders pay for hidden executive compensa-
tion when corporations buy "split-dollar" life insurance policies for top
executives. These arrangements, in which the premiums are split
between the corporation and the executive, create millions of dollars of
tax-free compensation for the executives without shareholder
knowledge."
Insurance companies have been very successful in marketing these
products to corporations and to banks and, now, even to charities
(CHOLI).'2 These developments have drawn little attention from the
public and Congress. The intense focus on corporate scandal after the
Enron, Tyco, Adelphia, and WorldCom debacles, however, has created
interest in these insurance schemes in the business press and among leg-
islators. Reporters for the Wall Street Journal have been writing regu-
larly about these issues since the beginning of 2002.13 The Internal
Revenue Service increasingly has been disallowing deductions taken
with respect to these schemes, and courts have been upholding the disal-
lowances.14 It is important that remaining loopholes are plugged while
the public's attention is focused on overreaching by corporations. When
no one is watching, it is difficult for rank-and-file employees and non-
institutional shareholders to know that they are being taken advantage of
by large corporations, which are aided and abetted by large insurance
companies.
Employees should not be worth more to their employers, or former
employers, dead than alive. Not only should the employees' consent be
required for such an arrangement, but the consent has to be meaningful
so they fully comprehend the scope of the benefits accruing to the
employer. Similarly, shareholders must be able to know when a com-
pany's earnings are increased by COLI - rather than from business
activities - and when the company's payments for life insurance premi-
ums for executives increase executives' pay and benefits beyond what is
clearly reported.
This article explores in Part II the issue of insurable interest, specif-
ically, why employers may be allowed to insure the lives of employees
whose deaths, individually, have no particular effect on the financial
well-being of the company. Part III discusses employee rights, with
11. See, e.g., Ellen E. Schultz & Theo Francis, Top Executives at Enron Shield Pension
Benefits, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2002, at A3.
12. Ellen E. Schultz & Theo Francis, Dying to Donate: Charities Invest in Death Benefits,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2003, at B I.
13. See, e.g., supra notes 6, 8, 10, & 11.
14. See infra notes 95-107 and accompanying text. But see Dow Chem. Co. v. United States,
250 F. Supp. 2d 748 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (ordering the IRS to return to Dow over $22 million in
deductions for interest on COLI policies after holding that the policies were not economic shams).
[Vol. 58:653
CORPORATE-OWNED LIFE INSURANCE
respect to COLI, and relevant litigation. The tax considerations of COLI
and relevant litigation are examined in Part IV. Part V describes how
corporations profit from COLI and discusses shareholders' right to know
the sources of corporations' income. Part VI summarizes, in light of
recent legislation, split-dollar arrangements that hide executive compen-
sation and their future viability. The final section concludes that no one
should be able to insure the life of another without the consent of the
insured; that corporations should not be able to shift the cost of
employee benefit programs to the taxpayer through tax-advantaged
COLI programs; and that a corporation should be required to indicate
clearly to shareholders the total compensation it is granting top manage-
ment and the profit it enjoys that is directly attributable to COLI
programs.
II. INSURABLE INTEREST
In 1921 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declared that
'[a]n insurable interest . . . must . . . reasonably justify a well-
grounded expectation of advantage, dependent upon the life insured,
so that the purpose of the party effecting the insurance may be to
secure that advantage, and not merely to put a wager upon human
life.' . . . [T]here [must be] a real concern in the life of the party
named, whose death would be the cause of substantial loss to those
who are named as beneficiaries. This does not follow the cessation
of ordinary service, but arises where the success of the business is
dependent on the continued life of the employee. 5
This explanation of "insurable interest" indicates why the law will not
allow an individual to pay premiums on a life insurance policy for a
stranger and then collect as beneficiary when the stranger dies. For
example, years ago it was not unusual for people to buy insurance on the
lives of famous people they did not know, betting on the celebrities'
early demise. 6 The law of "insurable interest" developed to discourage
people without a genuine interest in the continued life of another from
wagering on that person's death and from creating a circumstance in
which they would benefit from that person's death. As the Texas
15. United Sec. Life Ins. v. Trust Co. of Pa., 113 A. 446, 446 (Pa. 1921); see also Turner v.
Davidson, 4 S.E.2d 814 (Ga. 1939).
An employer does not have "insurable interest" in life of employee solely because of
relationship of employer and employee, but employer must have substantial economic interest in
life of employee, and, by virtue of relationship, must reasonably expect to reap substantial
pecuniary benefit through continued life of employee and to sustain consequent loss upon
employee's death . . . . A small and insignificant readjustment, which would normally follow
death of employee performing ordinary duties requiring no special skill or knowledge, will not
give employer an "insurable interest" in life of employee. Id. at 814-15.
16. See Dow Chem., 250 F. Supp. 2d at 748.
2004]
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Supreme Court has said, "[T]he public has a controlling concern that no
person have an interest that may give rise to a temptation to destroy [the
insured's] life."17 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that life insurance
policies purchased by one without an insurable interest in the insured are
against public policy because they constitute "a mere wager, by which
the party taking the policy is directly interested in the early death of the
[in]sured. Such policies have a tendency to create a desire for the
event."18 Lower courts have noted that the "public policy against
'wager' policies is so strong that the carrier issuing such a policy may be
liable for death or other injury to the insured resulting from the carrier's
failure to exercise reasonable care in the issuance of the policy," that is,
issuing it to one without an insurable interest. 9
Thus, an insurable interest is required to purchase a life insurance
policy, but it "is not easy to define with precision what will in all cases
constitute as insurable interest, so as to take the contract out of the class
of wager policies."20 Nevertheless, it has been well accepted since at
least the nineteenth century that each person has the right to insure his or
her own life by naming someone else as the beneficiary.21 In addition,
many states have statutes outlining other circumstances when an insura-
ble interest exists for personal insurance. Most of the statutes describe
two situations when there is an insurable interest: when there is a close
blood or legal relationship that engenders "love and affection;" or when
there is "a reasonable expectation of pecuniary advantage through the
continued life" of the insured person and consequent loss by reason of
his or her death.
22
17. Drane v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 161 S.W.2d 1057, 1059 (Tex. 1942).
18. Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775, 779 (1881); see also Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149,
154 (1911). Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the Court noting that a "contract of insurance
upon a life in which the insured has no interest is a pure wager that gives the insured a sinister
counter interest in having the life come to an end." Id. In 1884, the Supreme Court of Alabama
said:
There is no limit to the insurable interest which a man may have in his own life; but
there are forcible reasons why a mere stranger should not be permitted to speculate
upon the life of one whose continued existence would bring to him no expectation
of possible benefit or advantage .... [Wager policies, or such as are procured by a
person who has no interest in the subject of insurance, are undoubtedly most
pernicious in their tendencies, because in the nature of premiums upon the
clandestine taking of human life. . . . [S]uch policies, if valid, not only afford
facilities for a demoralizing system of gaming, but furnish strong temptations to the
party interested to bring about, if possible, the event insured against.
Helmtag's Adm'r v. Miller, 76 Ala. 183 (1884).
19. Burton v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 298 S.E.2d 575, 577 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982).
20. Warnock, 104 U.S. at 779.
21. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. France, 94 U.S. 561, 564 (1876).
22. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-14-3(a) (2002); ALASKA STAT. § 21.42.020(d)(1) & (2)
(Michie 2002); Aiz. REV. STAT. § 20-1104(C)(1) & (2) (2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-
[Vol. 58:653
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The latter situation contemplated the interests of creditors or sure-
ties who have obvious financial interests in the continued life of the
insured. The "love and affection" interest was generally viewed "as
more powerful ... to protect the life of the insured than any other con-
sideration."23 The statutes also often create a specific corporate insura-
ble interest in the lives of any directors, officers or employees whose
death might cause financial loss to the corporation. 4 The corporation
buys insurance on the lives of these "key" employees, naming itself as
beneficiary to protect it in the event of the death of such an employee
who is important to the corporation's success. In the 1980s, in
response to vigorous lobbying by insurance companies, many state
insurance departments modified their rules to allow businesses to
purchase COLI on the lives of rank-and-file employees whose specific
deaths will not have any appreciable effect on the success of the busi-
ness.2 6 Moreover, in the last decade or so, some state legislatures have
amended their insurable interest statutes so that charitable organizations
are deemed to have an insurable interest in the life of any individual who
consents to the charity's owning or purchasing life insurance on his or
103(c)(1)(A) & (B) (Michie 2002); CAL. INS. CODE § 10110.1(a) (West 2002); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 18, § 2704(c)(1) & (2) (2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-3(a) (2002); IDAHO CODE § 41-
1804(3)(a) & (b) (Michie 2002); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.14-040(4)(a) & (b) (Banks-Baldwin
2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2404(3)(A) & (B) (West 2002); MD. CODE ANN., Ins.
§ 12-201(b)(2)(i) & (b)(3) (2002); Miss. CODE ANN. § 83-5-251(3)(a) & (b) (2002); MoNT. CODE
ANN. § 33-15-201 (3)(a) & (b) (2002); NEV. REV. STAT. 687B.040(3) (2001); N.Y. INS. LAW
§ 3205(a)(1)(A) & (B) (McKinney 2002); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-29-09.1(3)(a) & (b) (2001);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3604(C)(1) & (2) (2002); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 512 (West 2002); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 27-4-27(c)(1) & (2) (2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-10-4 (1) & (2) (Michie
2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-104(2)(a)(i)(A) & (B) (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-
301(B)(1) & (2) (Michie 2002); WASH. REV. CODE § 48.18.030(3)(a) & (b) (2002); W. VA. CODE
§ 33-6-2(c)(1) & (2) (2002); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 26-15-102(c)(i) & (ii) (Michie 2002). But see
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.49-1 § 3 (Vernon 2001) (having only a blanket rule that permits
anyone of legal age to consent in writing to the purchase of insurance on his or her life by any
other person or legal entity).
23. Warnock, 104 U.S. at 779.
24. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-14-3(c)(2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-103(c)(1)(D) (Michie
2002); CAL. INS. CODE § 10110.1(c) (West 2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-3(c) (2002); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 123A (2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-58-75 (2002) (granting any employer
an insurable interest in the life of an employee for the benefit of the employer). But see DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 18, § 2704(c)(3) (2002) (stating that an employer that provides life, health, disability,
retirement or similar benefits to employees (even if it is only to some of them) has an insurable
interest in the lives of all its employees); IND. CODE § 27-1-12-17.1(c) (2002) (stating that "[a]n
employer that provides life insurance, health insurance, disability insurance, retirement benefits,
or similar benefits to an employee ... has an insurable interest in the life of the employee" - but
not, presumably, in the lives of all employees); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 512 (West 2002)
(permitting corporations to insure the lives of employees without any qualifying requirement
based on the employees' financial value to the corporation).
25. 3 CoucH ON INSURANCE § 43.13 (1995).
26. Ellen E. Schultz & Theo Francis, Why Are Workers in the Dark?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 24,
2002, at CI.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
her life.2 7 As one reporter commented, "Why hold a bake sale when you
can have a dead pool?"28
The result of buying insurance on the life of someone in whom one
does not have an insurable interest varies by state. In some states the
policy is void; the insbrance company is not liable on the contract and
may have to pay nothing or may just have to repay the premium pay-
ments.29 In others, if one without an insurable interest in the life of the
deceased receives the benefits of a life insurance policy, the executor or
administrator of the estate of the deceased may sue to recover the bene-
fits from the recipient. 30 The latter is the better arrangement because the
insurance company will not benefit by writing policies purchased by
those without insurable interests. If the policy just becomes void, the
insurance company has a strong incentive to write such policies: It col-
lects premiums and will never have to pay out on the policy. In a com-
mentary accompanying its insurable interest statute, the Wisconsin
statutory compilation notes that:
[t]he best way to discourage insurers from issuing insurance policies
to persons without insurable interest is to make them pay if they do,
not to permit them to freely issue such policies knowing that they
have a good public policy defense that lets them off the hook when-
ever a loss occurs. The court should have the power to order the
proceeds paid as justice dictates. 3'
Furthermore, some state courts have held that insurance carriers are 1ia-
27. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-14-3(d)(2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-1104(C)(4) (2002);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-103(c)(2)(A) (Michie 2002); CAL. INS. CODE § 10110.1(f) (West 2002);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-7-115 (2002); FLA. STAT. ch. 627.404(2) (2002); IOWA CODE § 511.39
(2001) KANS. STAT. ANN. § 40-450(b) (2001); MINN. STAT. § 61A.073 (2002); Mor. CODE ANN.
§ 33-15-201 (5) (2002) (requiring that insurance is purchased with the insured individual's
contributions); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-704(4) (2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-18-5 (2002); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 26.1-29-09.1(3)(d) (2001); OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3604(D) (2002); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 58-10-4 (4) (Michie 2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-301(b)(4) (Michie 2002); WASH. REV.
CODE § 48.18.030(3) & (4) (2002); W. VA. CODE § 33-6-2(c)(4) (2002). But see MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 175, § 123A(2) (2003) (stating that a charitable institution has an unlimited insurable
interest in the life of any donor without requiring specific consent); N.Y. INS. LAW § 3205(b)(3)
(McKinney 2002) (permitting a charitable institution to obtain life insurance on any person
without requiring consent).
28. Jennifer Schuessler, Office Indemnity: Does Your Employer Want You Dead?, BOSTON
GLOBE, Mar. 9, 2003, at D3.
29. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-14-3(f)(2002) (premium payments); CAL. INS. CODE
§ 10110.1(e) (West 2002) (nothing); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:35-11 (West 2002) (nothing).
30. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 21.42.020(b) (Michie 2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-1104(B)
(2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-103(b) (Michie 2002); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2704(b)
(2002); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10-204(c) (2002); IDAHO CODE § 41-1804(2) (Michie 2002); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2404(2) (West 2002); N.Y. INS. LAW § 3205(b)(4) (McKinney
2002); OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3604(B) (2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 743.024(2) (2001); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 27-4-27(b) (2001); Wis. STAT. § 631.07(4) (2001).
31. WIS. STAT. § 631.07 cmt. (2001).
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ble in negligence for issuing policies to people without an insurable
interest in the insured.32
Only a minority of the statutes described above require employers
with an insurable interest in their employees to obtain the consent of the
individuals being insured.33 Among those that do, only Oklahoma spec-
ifies that the employee's consent must be sought and obtained before a
life insurance policy is purchased.
34
Most of the statutes require that the insurable interest exists at the
time the life insurance policy first goes into effect, but it does not have
to exist at the time the loss occurs. 35 That is, a corporation can continue
to insure and remain the beneficiary of an employee who has been fired,
who has resigned, or who has retired.
Some states have created an insurable interest for employers in the
lives of their employees only when the proceeds of policies are used to
support employee benefit plans. Kentucky, for example, permits an
employer to obtain life insurance on the life of an employee with itself
as beneficiary only "for the purpose of funding a pension or other bene-
32. See, e.g., Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Weldon, 100 So. 2d 696 (Ala. 1958); Bajwa v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 776 N.E.2d 606 (II1. Ct. App. 2002); Ramey v. Carolina Life Ins. Co.,
135 S.E.2d 362 (S.C. 1964).
33. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 10110.1(c) (West 2002) (requiring consent but without
definition); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2708 (2002) (requiring consent but without definition); 215
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/224.1 (West 2002) (requiring consent and defining it as "written notice
of the coverage and [not rejecting the coverage] within 30 days of receipt of such notice"); KANS.
STAT. ANN. § 40-452(a) & (b) (2001) (requiring consent and defining it as written notice of the
coverage and not rejecting the coverage within 30 days of receipt of such notice and noting that
retaliation for refusal to consent is unlawful); MD. CODE ANN., Ins. § 12-201(b)(4)(ii)(A) (2002)
(requiring written consent); Mo. REV. STAT. § 376.531(2) (2002) (requiring consent and defining
it as written notice of the coverage and not rejecting the coverage within 30 days of receipt of such
notice); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-704 (2002) (requiring written consent for anyone obtaining life
insurance on another except that obtained by a spouse or a child); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-29-
09.1(3)(e)(2001) (requiring consent and defining it as written notice of the coverage and [not
rejecting the coverage] within 30 days of receipt of such notice); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3911.091 (Anderson 2002) (requiring consent and defining it as written notice of the coverage
and not rejecting the coverage within 30 days of receipt of such notice and noting that retaliation
for refusal to consent is unlawful); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-104(2)(a)(v)(B)(II) (2002)
(requiring written consent).
34. OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, §§ 3604(C)(4)(b)(1) & (2) (2002). The Oklahoma statute also
prohibits retaliation against an employee who refuses to consent. Id. § 3604(C)(4)(c). In addition,
the insurable interest of the employer is limited to either an amount agreed to by the employee or
the amount the employee is entitled to under all employer benefit plans. Id. § 3604(C)(4)(d).
35. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-14-3(e)(2002); CAL. INS. CODE § 10110.1(d) (West 2002); GA.
CODE ANN. § 33-24-3(d) (2002); KANS. STAT. ANN. § 40-453 (2001); OG.A. STAT. tit. 36,
§ 3604(C)(4)(g) (2002); see also Ficke v. Prudential Ins. Co., 202 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Ky. Ct. App.
1947) (noting the general rule that "an insurable interest at the inception of a contract of life
insurance is regarded by most courts as sufficient, and it is immaterial that such an interest ceases
prior to the death of the insured").
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fit plan established for the employee. 36 Maine determined that a corpo-
ration has an insurable interest in the lives of its employees, past and
present, only for the purpose of funding aggregate employee benefit
plans.37 The Maryland, Missouri, Rhode Island, and Virginia statutes
require that the amount of the insurance on non-management or retired
employees not exceed an amount commensurate with employer-pro-
vided benefits.38
New York puts the most specific restrictions on corporations that
want to insure the lives of non-management employees. Its statute cre-
ates a corporate insurable interest in employees or retirees who are eligi-
ble to participate in an employee benefit plan, but it requires: (1) the
corporation to notify "prospective insureds in writing that coverage is
being obtained on their lives;" (2) "prospective insureds' consent in
writing to such coverage;" (3) corporate notification to terminated
employees of their right to have the coverage terminated unless they
have or will have the right to receive any employee benefit that is
financed by the life insurance coverage; and (4) corporate notification to
terminated employees whose benefits terminate that they have the right
to have the coverage terminated.39 Moreover, if the insurer changes, the
insureds must be informed of the change.40 During the first five years
after the corporation obtains life insurance on employees, it may not use
the policies as collateral for loans except in the case of unforeseen losses
or financial obligations. 4' The commentary accompanying the legisla-
tion that became effective in 1996 specifically notes that the purpose of
allowing corporations to insure the lives of non-management employees
is to help "employers in developing innovative means of financing
employee health and other benefits in the best interest[s] of the working
people of this state."'42 The legislation was "not intended to authorize
... 'leveraged' COLI," to permit employers to improve their earnings by
borrowing against the policies at reduced rates, and then reaping the
benefits of tax deductions and payouts upon the deaths of the insured
employees.43 In carrying out the statutory intent, the New York Depart-
ment of Insurance requires any corporation using a COLI product to
36. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.14-040(1) (Banks-Baldwin 2002).
37. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2404(3)(D) (West 2002).
38. MD. CODE ANN., Ins. § 12-201(b)(4)(ii)(2)(B) (2002); Mo. REV. STAT. § 376.531(3)
(2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-4-27(c)(ii) (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-301(B)(3) (Michie 2002)
(also requiring that employees other than key employees must have been employed for 12
consecutive months).
39. N.Y. INS. LAW § 3205(d)(1) (McKinney 2002).
40. Id. § 3205(d)(4).
41. Id. § 3205(d)(5).




submit a letter stating the basis for determining insurable interest and
explaining how conditions satisfying the basis will be verified." Usual
bases would be to fund an employee benefit plan including, for example,
post-retirement health benefits, or a plan for key persons.45 The letter
must also include the notice, consent, and right to termination forms that
will be given to employees.4 6  The letter must also confirm that for
employee benefit plan COLI, the total amount of insurance coverage
will not exceed the costs of the program, or for key person COLI, the
steps the corporation will take to insure that the amount of insurance will
not exceed "the estimate of the potential loss that the corporation would
incur from the untimely death of the key employee."47
Although the concept of "insurable interest" has long been consid-
ered an important requirement for creating a valid insurance policy, it is
not particularly effective in protecting employees and shareholders from
corporate abuse in insuring the lives of rank-and-file employees. The
unique Texas regimen of having an insurable interest created merely, but
only, by the insured's consent is a much better way of protecting
employees from having their lives, or more specifically their deaths,
used in ways they find offensive.48 In addition, Texas Department of
Insurance guidelines note that "[w]hen a person is no longer eligible to
be a member of the group, the person should no longer be insured."49
44. N.Y. STATE DEPT. OF INS., GUIDELINES FOR CORPORATE-OWNED LIFE INSURANCE (Feb.
28, 2002), available at www.ins.state.ny.us/acrobat/colich.pdf) (last visited Mar. 17, 2003).
45. Id. § II.A.2.
46. Id. § II.A.4.
47. Id. § II.A.7.
48. Furthermore, replacing "insurable interest" with "consent of the insured" as a prerequisite
for insuring the life of another in all circumstances, including where there is a relationship the law
would consider one of love and affection, is probably a good idea. Relationships of love and
affection seem more fleeting than they once were. Consent of the insured might discourage a
disaffected spouse, for example, from considering the benefits of his or her spouse's demise.
There are many reported examples of one spouse killing the other "for the insurance money." See,
e.g., Leslie Brown, Triad, GREENSBORO NEWS & RECORD, Dec. 30, 2001, at RI; Walter Griffin,
Jury Selection to Begin in Contract Murder, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, July 27, 2002, at 5; Craig
Jarvis, Start of Trial Caps Months of Suspense, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC), May 4, 2003,
at Al; Jacqueline M. Jauregui, Toxic Mold: Do Insurers Have a Duty to Warn Policyholders or
Others of the Potential Health Risks?, FICC Q., Oct. 1, 2001, at 191; Derek Jensen, Witness Tells
of Payoff for Slaying Allen's Wife, DESERET NEWS, Feb. 9, 2000, at B4; Week in Review; Nov.3-9,
WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 2002, at C4; Wife Killed Lane for Insurance Policy, Prosecutor Says,
NAT'L POST, Aug. 26, 2000, at A17; see also Ramey v. Carolina Life Ins. Co., 135 S.E.2d 362
(S.C. 1964) (plaintiff alleging he sustained serious injuries when his wife poisoned him with
arsenic in an attempt to collect on a $5000 life insurance policy she bought on his life without his
knowledge or consent); cf. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Weldon, 100 So. 2d 696 (Ala. 1958)
(father alleging carrier's negligence in selling life insurance policy on life of his daughter, without
his consent, to daughter's aunt who then murdered insured niece).
49. TEXAS DEPT. OF INS., CORPORATE OWNED LIFE INSURANCE CHECKLIST (2002) (relying on
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. arts. 21.24, 3.42(i)(2), 3.50 (Vernon 2002)).
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Prohibiting corporations from maintaining life insurance on former
employees certainly carries out the public policy of eliminating "tempta-
tions to the party interested to bring about, if possible, the event insured
against. ' 5° Corporations receive no benefit from the continued life of
former employees.
III. EMPLOYEES' RIGHTS AND CONSENT
Because Texas law supports the position that COLI policies are
unreasonable and unfair if they are taken out on the lives of non-key
employees without their consent, courts in Texas have been the forums
for lawsuits seeking to void such policies and to obtain the insurance
proceeds for the estate of the deceased employee. The plaintiffs' theory
in these cases has been based on the corporations' lack of an insurable
interest in the lives of their non-key employees. Although the Texas
statutes are not as explicit as those in other states, Texas courts have
routinely held that "[i]t is against the public policy of this state to allow
anyone who has no insurable interest to be the owner of a policy of
insurance upon the life of a human being."51
In a case decided in 2002 by the U.S. District Court for the South-
ern District of Texas, the estate of a deceased former employee of Wal-
Mart sued Wal-Mart and its insurer to obtain the proceeds of an insur-
ance policy that Wal-Mart had taken out on the life of the employee,
Douglas Sims, naming itself as beneficiary. 2 From 1993 through 1995,
Wal-Mart bought about 350,000 COLI policies (through a trust it had
created to buy and be the beneficiary of the policies) on the lives of its
employees. 53 When Sims died, his estate successfully sued Wal-Mart to
recover approximately $64,000 in death benefits payable under one of
those policies. 54 The estate claimed that Wal-Mart had no insurable
interest in Douglas Sims's life. The federal court reiterated the Texas
Supreme Court's common law rule that one can have an insurable inter-
est in the life of another only when: (1) there is such a close relation
"'by blood or affinity that [one] wants the other to continue to live,
irrespective of the monetary considerations; ' ' 56 or (2) one is a creditor; or
(3) one has "a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit or advantage
50. Helmtag's Adm'r v. Miller, 76 Ala. 183 (1884).
51. Cheeves v. Anders, 28 S.W. 274, 275 (1894); accord Empire Life Ins. Co. of America v.
Moody, 584 S.W.2d 855, 859 (Tex. 1979); Drane v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 161 S.W.2d
1057, 1058-59 (Tex. 1942).




56. Id. at 798 (citing Empire Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Moody, 584 S.W.2d at 859).
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from the continued life of another." 7 The last category, according to
the Texas Supreme Court
is determined by monetary considerations, viewed from the stand-
point of the beneficiary. Would he ... enjoy more substantial eco-
nomic returns should the insured continue to live; or would he have
more, in the form of the proceeds of the policy, should he die.... [If
the beneficiary] would profit by [the insured's] death, the policy is
void ...since the public has a controlling concern that no person
have an interest that may give rise to a temptation to destroy [the
insured's] life.58
In other words, the employee must be so important that the success of
the enterprise might be compromised by his or her death.5 9
A mere employer-employee relationship is insufficient to give rise
to an employer's insurable interest in the employee.6 ° Sims was not an
officer, director or shareholder of Wal-Mart; he was just an employee.61
The court noted that it was "obvious" and "[clommon sense" that not all
350,000 Wal-Mart employees whose lives Wal-Mart had insured "could
have been individuals that the company looked to 'primarily for the suc-
cess of the business.' "62 Because Wal-Mart failed to demonstrate Sims's
specific importance to the company, the court rejected its assertion that
it had an insurable interest in Sims. 63 The court also rejected Wal-
Mart's claim of an insurable interest based on its need to defray the costs
of replacing an employee who dies; insurable interest is based on the
pecuniary value that the employee contributes when alive.' In arriving
at these conclusions, the district court relied on several Texas Supreme
Court decisions 65 and two recent Texas Courts of Appeals decisions.
66
Finally, the district court referred to public policy in Texas as evi-
denced by the Texas Legislature's grant to individuals of the right to
57. Id.
58. Drane v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 161 S.W.2d 1057, 1059 (Tex. 1942).
59. McBride v. Clayton, 166 S.W.2d 125, 128-29 (Tex. 1942).
60. Stillwagoner v. Travelers Ins. Co., 979 S.W.2d 354, 358 (Tex. App. 1998). A mere
employer-employee relationship is distinguished from the "key man" concept that was recognized
by the Texas Legislature in 1921. Mayo v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 220 F. Supp. 2d 794, 799 n.l 1
(S.D. Tex. 2002). The statute, originally enacted in 1921 and recodified in 1951, allows a
business to purchase and be the beneficiary of life insurance policies on officers or stockholders
who are deemed significant to the ongoing success of the business. Mayo, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 799.
61. Mayo, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 800.
62. Id. at 801.
63. Id. at 802-03.
64. Id. at 804.
65. Id. at 805 (citing Empire Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Moody, 584 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1979));
McBride v. Clayton, 166 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. 1942); Drane v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 161
S.W.2d 1057 (Tex. 1942)).
66. Id. at 805 (citing Tamez v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 999 S.W.2d 12 (Tex.
App. 1999)).
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decide who their insurance beneficiaries would be and to select and
approve in writing any third party owner of insurance on their lives.
67
Wal-Mart did not ask for Sims's consent or obtain his approval in writ-
ing as required by Texas statute. 68 Wal-Mart did send flyers to its store
managers briefly describing its new program, but there was no evidence
that the managers or rank-and-file employees ever received them.69
Moreover, the flyer contained only an "opt out" form that would elimi-
nate any way for Wal-Mart to obtain evidence that a worker actually
received the flyer or understood it, clearly an abridgment of Texas pub-
lic policy, which requires an informed choice on the part of employees
as to whether their employer should be the owner and beneficiary of
insurance policies on their lives.7"
Wal-Mart has discontinued its COLI program for non-key employ-
ees. 7' Unless employees are comfortable with the notion that most of us
would be worth more dead than alive to our employers, and that is prob-
ably not a comforting thought, COLI programs without informed con-
sent for rank-and-file employees should be outlawed in every state. In
fact, members of the Corporate Owned Life Insurance Working Group
of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, a voluntary
organization of the chief insurance regulatory officials of the fifty states,
the District of Columbia, and the four U.S. territories recommended in
September 2002 that state laws be amended to require notice and affirm-
ative consent for COLI.
72
On the federal level, Representative Gene Green of Texas, outraged
that corporations are profiting from the deaths of their employees and
former employees, has introduced a bill, the Life Insurance Employee
Notification Act,73 that would eliminate some of the secrecy that exists
about COLI.7 1 The act would require companies to inform employees
that an insurance policy has been purchased on their lives and provide
the name of the insurer, the name of the beneficiary, and the amount of
the policy.7 5 Although the act would be an improvement over the pro-
67. Id. at 806, 808.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 807.
70. Id. at 807 n.36.
71. L.M. Sixel, Profiting from Death, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 16, 2002, at 1.
72. Press Release, National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Working Group Makes
Recommendation on Corporate Owned Life Insurance Sales (Sept. 10, 2002), available at
www.naic.org/pressroon/releases/relO2/091002_COLIpressrelease.htm.
73. H.R. 414, 108th Cong. (2003).
74. 149 CONG. Rc. E76-02 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2003) (extension of remarks by Rep. Green).
75. Id. A violation of the act would be an "unfair method of competition and an unfair or
deceptive act or practice under section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C.
45(a)(1))." H.R. 414, 108th Cong. § 2(c) (2003).
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tections employees have now, it does not go far enough because it does
not require employee consent. Meaningful, informed consent, with a
well-enforced prohibition on retribution for failure to consent, is the
only way to protect the rights of employees to control who benefits from
their deaths.
IV. TAX IMPLICATIONS
COLI plans have become favored arrangements for corporations in
large part because of their tax advantages. First, beneficiaries of life
insurance policies receive the death benefits free of income tax.76 Sec-
ond, the cash value that builds up in a life insurance policy is tax-
deferred and sometimes is never paid.77 Third, withdrawals from the
cash value build-up are treated as withdrawals from basis first and then
from earnings. As a result, those initial withdrawals up to basis are also
not taxable.78 Fourth, it is the strange, but usual, custom in the insur-
ance industry that insurance policy loans are not considered withdrawals
of cash from the value of the build-up within the policy itself, but rather
loans from the insurance company with the policy's cash value serving
only as collateral for the loan.7 9 The proceeds of those loans are not
taxable because loan proceeds are not considered income under the tax
code.80 Finally, interest on loans taken with the cash value of life insur-
ance policies as collateral are often tax deductible. t
To allow businesses to take full advantage of these tax benefits, the
insurance industry created a variety of plans, adapting them as the tax
76. I.R.C. §§ 72, 101(a)(l) (2002); see also In re CM Holdings, Inc., 254 B.R. 578, 581 (D.
Del. 2000), affid 301 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2002); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 250 F. Supp. 2d
748, 756 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
77. I.R.C. § 72(e) (2002); see In re CM Holdings, 254 B.R. at 581. COLI plans generally use
one of two kinds of insurance policies: whole life or universal life. In re CM Holdings, 254 B.R.
at 584. A whole life policy has a term equal to the whole life of the insured, and the owner of the
policy buys it from the insurance company by paying a fee called a premium. Id. at 583-84. The
premiums paid, less an administrative expense charge that includes an additional margin for
unanticipated expenses, are added to the cash value of the policy. Id. at 584. Furthermore, the
cash value accrues interest. Id. The "inside build-up" in the policy enables the policy owner to
take a policy loan from the insurance company, up to the cash value of the policy, using the cash
value as collateral. Id. Meanwhile, the encumbered cash value continues to earn interest. Id. The
interest rate on the loan is set in the policy and the loan does not have to be repaid because all of
the principal and interest on the loan can be deducted from the death benefit when the insured
dies. Id. A universal life policy is similar to a whole life policy with some additional flexibility in
annual premiums, death benefits, the ability to partially withdraw cash value, and interest rates.
Id.
78. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 250 F. Supp. 2d 748, 756 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
79. Am. Elec. Power, Inc. v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 2d 762, 780 (S.D. Ohio 2001), aftd,
326 F.3d 737 (2003).
80. I.R.C. § 61 (2002) (loan proceeds not included in list of items constituting gross income).
81. See In re CM Holdings, 254 B.R. at 581.
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laws changed, to maximize the interest deductions.82 Without the inter-
est deduction, some of these plans would not have been profitable to the
businesses despite the tax advantages given to the build-up within the
policies and the death benefits.83 In 1964, Congress attempted to limit
this tax arbitrage in plans contemplating "the systematic direct or indi-
rect borrowing of part or all of the increases in the cash value of such
[life insurance] contract[s], 84 but deductions were still allowed where
"no part of 4 of the annual premiums due during the [first] 7-year period
. . . is paid under such plan by means of indebtedness. 85 The Tax
Reform Act of 1986 attempted to limit these tax advantages further by
imposing a limit of $50,000 per insured employee on the amount of life
insurance policy indebtedness for which interest may be deducted.
8 6
In 1996, Congress again tightened this deduction loophole on COLI
loans.87 The House Report on the change noted that a "general principle
of accurate income tax measurement under an income tax system pro-
vides that expenses, such as interest, are not deducted from income if
they are costs of accretions to wealth that are not included in income."88
The House committee noted that it was "not appropriate to permit a
deduction for interest that is funding the increase in value of an asset of
which the [corporation owning the policy] is the ultimate beneficiary, as
recipient of the proceeds upon the insured [employee's] death."89
The Internal Revenue Code still allows a corporate deduction for
"all interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness."9
However, a tax deduction will be allowed for interest on COLI loans in
only three years of any seven-year period. This "4-of-7 safe harbor was
designed specifically to recognize the importance of borrowing on poli-
cies for 'other than tax saving purposes."' 91 The safe harbor does not
apply, however, if the COLI program is a sham.92 The sham-transaction
doctrine provides that a transaction is not entitled to respect in assessing
tax if it serves no business purpose other than generating tax benefits.93
A "taxpayer can legitimately structure a transaction to minimize tax lia-
82. In re CM Holdings, Inc., 301 F.3d 96, 100 (3d Cir. 2002).
83. Id.
84. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272 (codified as I.R.C. § 264(a)(3) (2002)).
85. I.R.C. § 264(d)(1) (2002).
86. H. REP. No. 102-432, at 61 (1992) (referring to U.S.C. §§ 264(a)(1) & (e)(l)).
87. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936, 2090.
88. H. REP. No. 104-280, at 303 (1995).
89. Id.
90. 26 U.S.C. § 163(a) (2002).
91. In re CM Holdings, Inc., 301 F.3d 96, 106 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing S. REP. No. 830 (1964)).
92. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Comm'r, 254 F.3d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir. 2001), cert. denied,




bility . . . [but] the transaction must nevertheless have factual and eco-
nomic substance. 94
Because the new limits on COLI interest deductions did not grand-
father in plans already in place, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
began disallowing these deductions that had been taken in prior years,
asserting the sham doctrine.9" In August 2001, the IRS implemented a
settlement plan that permitted businesses with COLI programs to settle
with the IRS if they conceded eighty percent of the interest deductions
they had taken for interest on loans associated with COLI.9 6 The IRS
settled with a variety of companies under the plan. For example, the
IRS reached a settlement with R.R. Donnelly & Sons Co. that called for
the company to pay the IRS $150,000,000, representing part of the
taxes plus interest on all prior deductions on loans secured by COLI
policies."
In reaction to the notable successes the IRS had in persuading
courts to affirm the deduction disallowances in suits brought by CM
Holdings,98 Winn-Dixie,99 and American Electric Power, 00 the IRS in
2002 terminated its settlement initiative with respect to leveraged COLI
plans.'0  Companies had until the beginning of 2003 to participate in
the settlement program by agreeing to give up eighty percent of the
COLI deductions they had claimed."0 2 About a hundred other compa-
nies, including American Greetings Corp., W.R. Grace, Hershey Foods,
Proctor & Gamble, Western Resources and Hillenbrand Industries, were
involved in disputes with the IRS concerning COLI-related deduc-
tions.10 3 Some estimate that these back taxes could amount to $6 bil-
lion." Others have said the sum could be much greater, and the
94. Am. Elec. Power, Inc. v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 2d 762, 778 (S.D. Ohio 2001), aft'd,
326 F.3d 737 (2003).
95. See, e.g., Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 254 F.3d at 1316 ; In re CM Holdings, 301 F.3d at
108; Am. Elec. Power, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 778; see also Ellen E. Schultz & Theo Francis, Valued
Employees: Worker Dies, Firm Profits, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2002, at Al.
96. I.R.S. Announcement 2002-96, 2002-43 I.R.B. 756.
97. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., R.R. Donnelley Settles IRS Dispute over Corporate Owned
Life Insurance Deductions (Apr. 5, 2002), available at www.rrdonnelley.com.
98. In re CM Holdings, 301 F.3d at 96.
99. Winn-Dixie Stores, 254 F.3d at 1313.
100. Am. Elec. Power, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 762.
101. I.R.S. Announcement, supra note 96.
102. Id.
103. See David M. Katz, The COLI Wars, CFO MAGAZINE, Jan. 1, 2001, at 87, available at
www.cfo.com; see also Mark P. Gergen, The Logic of Deterrence: Corporate Tax Shelters, 55
TAX L. REV. 255, 257 (2002).
104. Government Wins Tax-Shelter Victory in Winn-Dixie Case, WALL ST. J., June 29, 2001, at
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investigation could involve as many as 700 companies. 105 American
Greetings, for example, recorded a charge in 2001 of $143 million for
possible exposure to an IRS disallowance of COLI interest deduc-
tions.10 6 W.R. Grace noted an exposure of $57 million resulting from its
deduction of $163 million in COLI interest payments after 1992.107
Inspired by its three big wins in Winn-Dixie, In re CM Holdings,
and American Electric Power, the IRS also began using an unusual and
comprehensive set of document requests when auditing banks with
BOLl programs. 0 8 The American Bankers Association (ABA) warned
banks that these audits were not routine inquiries, but preparation for
litigation involving favorable tax treatment of BOLl plans. '0 9 The ABA
cautioned banks to pay particular attention to insurable interest and eco-
nomic substance in their BOLI plans." 0 It noted the IRS's public con-
cern when a "'29 year old employee who is making $30,000 and is
insured under a BOLl policy for $4 million.' " In such a case, it fore-
saw the IRS's asserting that "policy coverage far in excess of the risk of
loss of the bank may belie the intended business purpose for purchasing
policies.""' 2 The ABA was concerned about the IRS's search for docu-
mentation for the non-tax business purposes for purchasing BOLl and,
in light of the IRS's recent successes in courts in COLI cases, warned
banks to have the relevant documents available." 3
In 2003, however, the IRS suffered a setback when the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan ordered the IRS to pay Dow
Chemical Company more than $22 million plus interest and costs for
deductions the IRS improperly disallowed for interest and expenses
Dow claimed on its 1989, 1990, and 1991 tax returns in connection with
its COLI plans." 4 In 1988, Dow purchased COLI policies on the lives
of 4,051 upper management employees." 5 Then, in 1991, Dow pur-
chased COLI on the lives of 17,061 additional employees. 1 6 The Dow
COLI plans were similar to the plans in the Winn-Dixie, CM Holdings,
105. Ellen E. Schultz & Theo Francis, Valued Employees: Worker Dies, Firm Profits, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 19, 2002, at Al.
106. Id.
107. Id.













and American Electric Power cases, insofar as they all involved cash
value policies, premium payments over a relatively short period, highly
leveraged premium financing without loans in years four through seven,
and they were all used to fund future benefit obligations.' 1 7 Neverthe-
less, the differences between the latter three plans and the Dow plan
were significant enough for the courts in the latter three cases to hold
that those plans were economic shams, whereas the Dow court held that
"there was an economic benefit that potentially could be derived from
the plans without relying solely on the tax deductions for policy loan
interest" namely, "providing a source of cash to cover unfunded future
medical obligations for its retirees."
' 1 8
Dow became interested in COLI in 1989 when the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued Exposure Draft 105,
Employer's Accounting for Post Retirement Benefits Other than Pen-
sions. When adopted in 1990, it required employers to accrue current
liabilities for retiree medical and life insurance benefits on a current
basis on their financial statements." 19 Dow had been accounting for its
retiree medical benefits on a pay-as-you-go basis, and now under FAS
105, Dow had accrued retiree medical liabilities of $1.34 billion.120 It
planned to use COLI to fund these liabilities.1 2' In 1990, Michigan
enacted a statute that created an employer's insurable interest in the lives
of non-key employees and retirees up to the level of the employer's
projected unfunded benefit liabilities.' 22 Dow sought the consent of its
employees for participation in its COLI program, encouraging consent
by offering each employee a $5,000 death benefit.
123
The IRS disallowed Dow's tax deductions on its loans to pay the
COLI premiums, reasoning that the only economic benefit from the
plans was the tax deduction and, therefore, the plans were shams.'
24
Although taxpayers are allowed to reduce their tax obligations by any
legal means, where the only purpose of the transactions is to create tax
deductions, the transactions are not recognized by the government, are
considered shams, and will not support tax deductions. 25 The court in
Dow determined that unlike the other cases, Dow had pre-purchase illus-
117. Id. at 765.
118. Id. at 764.
119. Id. at 766.
120. Dow Chem, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 766.
121. Id. at 768.
122. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500.2210 (1991).
123. Dow Chem., 250 F. Supp. 2d at 785.
124. Id. at 798.
125. Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 365-66 (1960); ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157
F.3d 231, 247 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465,469 (1935) (discussing
sham transaction doctrine).
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trations that indicated a positive cash flow from the plan even without
tax deductions for loan interest.' 26 Furthermore, in the Winn-Dixie, CM
Holdings, and American Electric Power cases, the respective courts
found that the plans eliminated all risk by retrospectively "truing up" the
cost of insurance and the death benefits paid out each year to render
them equal.12 7 Thus, all risk was eliminated, making the COLI transac-
tion meaningless as far as providing insurance.'28 This did not occur in
the Dow plan; therefore, the Dow court determined that the COLI was
not a sham.
12 9
Even if successful, the IRS attack on the deductibility of interest on
COLI loans does not end COLI tax benefits for corporations. Corporate
owners of COLI still build up tax-free gains in the policies, and they
receive tax-free death benefits when their employees die, even if they
have not been employees for many years.'3 ° The Treasury Department
estimates that the tax exemption on COLI earnings will cost taxpayers
$9.3 billion in lost revenue each year for the next five years.' 3 '
V. PROFITING FROM COLI
The Texas Wal-Mart case discussed above just begins to suggest
the huge numbers of employees who are affected by COLI abuses. Nes-
tle USA has policies on the lives of 18,000 employees; Pitney Bowes
Inc. on 23,000; Proctor & Gamble Co. on 15,000; American Electric
Power Inc. on 20,000.132 One insurance company attorney has esti-
mated that between five million and six million workers in the United
States are covered by such insurance policies and that about a quarter of
the Fortune 500 companies have them.' 33
COLI has become an efficient profit center for companies. One
estimate has corporations earning up to sixteen percent of their profits
from "janitors' insurance." 134 Not only do the policies yield tax-free
income as their investment value rises, but companies also use that value
as collateral for loans when they need to raise cash. 135 In one case,
126. Dow Chem., 250 F. Supp. 2d at 801.
127. Id. at 807-08.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Theo Francis, Proposal Aims to Cut Tax Breaks in Corporate-Owned Life Policies, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 12, 2003, at C9.
131. Id.
132. Schultz & Francis, supra note 105.
133. L.M. Sixel, Profiting from Death?, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 16, 2002, at 1.
134. Press Release, Congressman Gene Green, Congressman Gene Green Calls for Hearing on
Corporate-Owned Life Insurance (Oct. 1, 2002), available at www.house.gov/green/
nrO0102.htm
135. Schultz & Francis, supra note 105.
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Public Service Company of New Mexico bought COLI policies for hun-
dreds of employees when the company needed to raise money to take its
nuclear power plants out of service. 36 Then, of course, there is the
death benefit when the employee dies, which the corporation can use for
any purpose it chooses. Businesses find out when retired or other for-
mer employees die by having the firms that manage the COLI policies
for them do "death runs" of Social Security numbers every quarter.'
37
Then, the former employer obtains the death certificates and sends them
to its insurance carrier.'38 CM Holdings, for example, had COLI poli-
cies for at least 1,400 employees in 1990.139 Younger workers would
typically generate between $400,000 and $500,000 in death benefits;
older workers would generate between $120,000 and $200,000.14° A
CM Holdings administrative assistant, for example, died in 1998 at age
62.141 Her family received a death benefit of $21,000 provided under an
employee benefit program while CM received a COLI benefit of
$180,000.142 A CM music store worker died in 1992 at age 29 of AIDS,
providing CM with a death benefit of about $340,000.143
One COLI arrangement that is particularly galling to workers was
the one created by Portland General, an Enron subsidiary.'" About sev-
enty-five percent of an estimated $80 million in benefits from the poli-
cies paid for a long-term compensation plan for managers, directors and
other top officers; the remaining twenty-five percent contributed to a
supplemental executive retirement plan.' 45 Workers who had their
entire retirement funds of hundreds of thousands of dollars wiped out by
Enron's collapse were shocked to discover that their deaths will support
benefit plans for top Enron executives.
146
Banks also have become significant purchasers of life insurance. 147
Wachovia Corp., for example, has BOLl policies insuring the lives of
about 20,000 of its employees, 48 constituting about one-fourth of its
workforce. The policies generate approximately three percent of the
136. Id.
137. Sixel, supra note 133.
138. Id.
139. Schultz & Francis, supra note 105.
140. Id. The same premium buys more coverage for younger workers because they are less








147. Theo Francis, Workers' Lives: Best Tax Break?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2003, at CI.
148. Id. Wachovia has about $6.1 billion in COLI policies.
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bank's operating earnings.' 4 9 KeyCorp of Cleveland and Sovereign
Bancorp of Philadelphia generated about twelve to fifteen percent of
their net income from BOLl policies. 50 Washington Mutual has more
than $1.3 billion of BOLl policies. 151 Bank of America, J.P. Morgan
Chase, and Bank One have billions of dollars of BOLl policies on the
lives of present and former employees.' 52 One financial services analyst
has estimated that about a quarter to a third of the nation's publicly
traded banks have BOLl policies covering their employees.
1 3
By federal statute, national banks are permitted to purchase and
hold an interest in life insurance as an exercise of "incidental powers as
shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking."'' 54 The Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) issues guidelines so banks can
correctly interpret the statute to determine if they can legally purchase
particular insurance products. 5 5 A 1991 OCC circular 56 clearly indi-
cated that there was no federal statutory authority for national banks to
purchase life insurance for their own account as an investment.' 57 In
1996, the OCC issued new guidelines for national banks instructing that
a "purchase of life insurance is incidental to banking, and ... therefore,
legally permissible, if it is convenient or useful in connection with the
conduct of the bank's business."'
' 58
When businesses use COLI or BOLl to fund employee benefit
plans (which some state statutes mandate as the only way for businesses
to have the required insurable interest in non-key employees), 59 they
generally use one of two methods to determine the amount of insurance
needed to finance the plans. First, using the recovery method, the busi-
ness projects the amount that will be owed to employees as benefits and
determines that sum's present value.' 60 The business then purchases
enough life insurance on the lives of its employees to ensure that the
gain from the insurance proceeds will reimburse the business for the
149. Theo Francis & Ellen E. Schultz, Big Banks Quietly Pile Up 'Janitors' Insurance, WALL
ST. J., May 2, 2002, at C1.
150. Big Business: Cashing in When You Cash Out, CERT TIMES: FIN. ED., May 2, 2002,
available at www.certtimes.com/fin//article.php?sid=45.
151. Id.
152. Francis & Schultz, supra note 149.
153. Id.
154. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2002).
155. Activities and Investments of Insured State Banks, 61 Fed. Reg. 43,486 (1996) (proposed
rule for F.D.I.C. to amend 12 C.F.R. pt. 362).
156. OFFICE OF THE CONTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BANKING CIRCULAR 249 (May 6, 1991).
157. Id. See also Activities and Investments of Insured State Banks, 61 Fed. Reg. 43,486
(1996) (proposed rule for F.D.I.C. to amend 12 C.F.R. pt. 36).
158. Guidelines for National Banks, 1996 OCC CB Lexis 92 (1996).
159. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
160. Guidelines for National Banks, supra note 158, at 29.
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benefit payments.16" ' Alternatively, the cost offset method allows the
business to project the annual expense of the benefit plan and purchase
enough insurance on the lives of employees so that the income earned on
the cash surrender value offsets the benefit expense. 162 When the busi-
ness collects death benefits, the proceeds enhance the business' bottom
line.
163
Employees and shareholders are generally uninformed about COLI
and BOLl programs because the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), the OCC, and state insurance regulators do not require specific
disclosure of them.1 64 For example, the OCC requires national banks to
record their interest in the cash surrender value of BOLl policies as an
"other asset."' 65 The increase in the cash surrender value over time is
recorded as "other non-interest income." 166 There is no easy way for an
interested person to know that these additions to an enterprise's bottom
line come from life insurance policies. A result of the secret nature of
these programs is that shareholders can be misled about the success of
the businesses in which they have invested. Businesses can disguise
poor results in their core enterprises through substantial additions to
their bottom lines of death benefits and the tax-free build-up of funds in
insurance policies.
To facilitate these arrangements, a small California banking sys-
tems design firm, Bancorp Services, has created a new life insurance
administration system through which large companies with substantial
investments in COLI policies may minimize the effect of short-term
market volatility on the companies' bottom lines. 167 The system allows
a company to report a "smoothed value on its quarterly profit and loss
statements."' 168 Its insurer records the policies' market value separately
from their "smoothed 'book' value" and the company "records the
increase in the smoothed book value to its income statement each
year."'169 The fact that Bancorp's system has been in great demand sug-
gests a widespread use of COLI policies to beef up company profits
rather than merely to protect the company from financial losses due to
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id at 30.
164. Theo Francis & Ellen E. Schultz, Why Secret Insurance on Employees Pays Off, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 25, 2002, at CI.
165. Guidelines for National Banks, 1996 OCC CB Lexis 92 (1996), at 23.
166. Id.
167. Bancorp Serv. v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., No. 4:00-cv-70 CEJ, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
26267 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 25, 2002). See also Fight over New Idea Leads to $118 Million Award,
NAT'L L.J., Feb. 3, 2003, at C7.
168. Id.
169. Francis & Schultz, supra note 164.
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the deaths of employees, or to cover the costs of employee benefit pro-
grams. Bancorp has been involved in litigation with their former client,
the Hartford Life Insurance Company, as well as Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company and Sun Life to determine who has rights to the
system. 1
70
Businesses purchasing COLI are not the only ones profiting from
the arrangement. Insurance companies aggressively market COLI, and
in recent years COLI has accounted for about twenty-five to thirty per-
cent of all new life insurance sales. 17
VI. SPLIT-DOLLAR INSURANCE
Through the use of split-dollar insurance, businesses use insurance
in another way that keeps shareholders and others from understanding
the true nature of the transactions. In a split-dollar scheme, a company
executive (or an insurance trust created for the executive) owns a perma-
nent life insurance contract. 72 The executive then chooses the policy
beneficiary. 73  The term "split-dollar" refers to the arrangement
whereby the corporation pays most of the premiums on the policy, and
the executive makes only a small contribution to the premium pay-
ments. 174 The executive can use the value that builds up in the policy.
When the executive dies, the corporation gets back the money it has
advanced for premiums, and the executive's estate gets the remainder of
the death benefit, free of estate and income taxes. 75 Split-dollar poli-
cies have several important advantages for executives: (1) the policies
are more secure than pensions because pensions are backed only by cor-
porate promises, whereas the policies are backed by a regulated insur-
ance company; (2) the executives own the policies outright, and
therefore can take the policies with them when they leave the company;
(3) if the company goes into bankruptcy, creditors do not have any rights
to the policies, in contrast to the vulnerability of pension plan assets; (4)
the executive can choose how the policy's cash value is invested; (5)
the split-dollar arrangement hides large amounts of executive compensa-
tion because the policies are valued in corporate filings as having the
170. Bancorp Serv., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26267. The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri awarded Bancorp $118.34 in its lawsuit against the Hartford Life
Insurance Company for breach of contract and misappropriation of a trade secret.
171. See Francis, supra note 147.
172. Alan L. Meltzer, Employer-Paid Life Insurance, A Benefit to Shareholders, WASH. Bus.







same value as term life insurance policies which, in reality, are worth
only a small fraction of the whole or universal life insurance policies in
the split-dollar arrangement; and (6) the executives pay tax only on the
term value of the policy.
176
Split-dollar policies have become a major method of giving top cor-
porate executives tax-favorable pay and loans and death benefits to their
heirs, hidden from shareholder scrutiny. 177 Enron had created a split-
dollar arrangement for its former Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Ken-
neth Lay, who received a $12 million life insurance policy, with the
corporation contributing $1.25 million in premiums.178 GE also paid for
a split-dollar policy for its former CEO and chairman Jack Welch.' 7 9
John W. Snow, the new Secretary of the Treasury and former CEO and
chairman of CSX Corporation, had a split-dollar agreement under which
CSX promised in 2001 to buy him a $25 million life insurance policy
within seven years. 180 When Snow left CSX to become Treasury secre-
tary, the company had not yet bought the insurance policy; instead, CSX
will pay Snow $5 million, the amount needed to buy about $25 million
of life insurance. 81 Significantly, the Treasury Department is consider-
ing new regulations that could result in a ban on split-dollar agree-
ments,'82 but the insurance industry is lobbying vigorously to protect
these arrangements.183 Snow characterized the lump-sum payment he is
to receive in lieu of the split-dollar insurance policy as a step to avoid a
conflict of interest. 
84
Former Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill had a split-dollar life
insurance policy for which his corporation, Alcoa, had paid $891,000 in
premiums.' 85 His federal disclosure form listed the value of the policy
as between $250,000 and $500,000, but SEC filings state that the policy
would add about $750,000 a year to O'Neill's pension in retirement.
86
Split-dollar policies have become a major method of giving top cor-
176. Theo Francis & Ellen E. Schultz, Insurers Move to Protect Executive Policy, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 30, 2002, at C1.
177. Id.
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at the Top, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2002, at A4.
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porate executives tax-free pay and loans, and death benefits to their
heirs, hidden from shareholder scrutiny.' 87 Other companies that have
split-dollar agreements with their top executives include Equifax, Gen-
eral Motors, H.J. Heinz, and Unifi. 188 Charities have also been involved
in split-dollar arrangements allowing donors to make a donation to a
charitable organization, and in return receive a tax deduction. The char-
ity then uses part of those funds to buy life insurance policies for the
benefit of the donor.'89 The IRS outlawed this scheme in 1999 as an
abusive tax shelter.190
Some critics forecast the demise of split-dollar arrangements
because of the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.19 The
act, which is supposed to "protect investors by improving the accuracy
and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities
laws," 1 92 prohibits corporations from making loans to directors or execu-
tive officers.' 93 The purpose of the prohibition is to prevent directors
and executive officers from obtaining favorable loans from the corpora-
tion at the expense of shareholders. 194 If access to the build-up of the
value within a split-dollar policy is deemed a loan, it would now be
banned under the act. Moreover, if each premium payment is consid-
ered a material modification of the loan, then split-dollar plans existing
at the time of the act's enactment would not be grandfathered, and
would be in violation of the law.195 Violations of the act are punishable
as criminal offenses. 196 Leading corporate law firms appear unsure of
whether Sarbanes-Oxley does, in fact, cover the split-dollar insurance
plans. 197 If it does, shareholders would be well served because split-
dollar schemes serve no purpose but to hide executive compensation.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is unseemly for businesses to benefit from the deaths of their
employees, some of whom may have been terminated many years
187. Francis & Schultz, supra note 176.
188. Id.
189. Monica Langley, Effort to Limit Popular Tax Break Gains Momentum, WALL ST. J., May
5, 2000, at B8.
190. Id.
191. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002); see Lynnley Browning, The Perks Flow (but
with Less Fizz), N.Y. TIMES, EXECUTIVE PAY: A SPECIAL REPORT, Apr. 6, 2003, at 6.
192. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
193. Id. § 402(a).
194. See Andrew J. Willms, Split-Dollar Insurance: New Rulings, New Regulations (and
Sarbanes-Oxley?), 17 No. 2 PRAC. TAX LAW. 23, 26 (2003).
195. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 787 (2002).
196. Willms, supra note 194, at 26.
197. Corporate Law Firms Explore Gray Areas of New Ban on Loans, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16,
2002, at C 15.
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before, without the employees' having agreed to the arrangement or, in
fact, having known about it. The Rev. Jesse Jackson analogized COLI
policies to those that slaveholders purchased on the lives of their human
property. 98 That is a particularly dramatic and distasteful comparison,
but modem-day COLI policies may actually be worse. Considering the
importance of many slaves to the commercial enterprises of the slave-
holders, it is probable that many slaves were worth more to their masters
alive than dead. On the other hand, individually, each of the 300,000
rank-and-file employees whose lives were insured by Wal-Mart had lit-
tle or no impact on the fortunes of their employer, and would be worth
more to Wal-Mart dead than alive.
Basic public policy in every state dictates that one should not be
able to insure the life of another when that person is worth more to the
beneficiary dead than alive. At the very least, to protect an employee's
interest in his or her own life, no employer should be able to insure the
life of an employee and name the employer as beneficiary, without the
informed consent of the employee. In fact, in light of indications of
societal breakdowns of family and "love and affection" relationships, no
person should be the object of any life insurance policy without his or
her consent.
Some states decided to make an exception to this basic public pol-
icy concern when the purpose of COLI plans is to fund employee benefit
plans. This exception, however, does not only impose on employees and
former employees, it also creates a tremendous imposition on taxpayers
when the federal trend is to relieve taxpayers of employee benefit bur-
dens. At the same time that the federal government is encouraging the
privatization of retirement benefits, COLI does exactly the opposite -
but secretly, so the taxpayer will not know about it. Companies are
funding their employee benefit plans with the tax-free income that builds
up in COLI and with the tax-free payouts the companies receive when
the insured employees die. They are shifting their responsibility for
their employees' benefits programs to the taxpayer. President Bush has
said he would like the government to pay less and the private sector to
pay more. If that is truly the goal, then the tax advantages that COLI
now enjoys must be eliminated. Currently, the costs of COLI to the
taxpayer is more than the cost of the tax breaks the government gives to
encourage economic empowerment zones ($9.3 billion compared with
$7.2 billion over five years), or the cost of the deductions for interest on
student loans ($3.5 billion over five years).
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Finally, the SEC has to require clear and specific disclosure of prof-
its earned from COLI programs and of executives' actual benefits from
insurance policies. The shareholder has a right to know how much top
management is earning in total and whether the strength of publicly
traded companies comes from the performance of its core businesses or
from some financial scheme involving COL.
